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 1 
Introduction 
Throughout the 1990s, several Middle-Income Developing Countries (MIDCs) were 
opposed to the inclusion of labour standards into trade agreements. The recent 
surge in exports from China, a country with a poor compliance record with 
workers’ rights, may have however had an impact on their position. This article 
explores to which extent this has been the case and highlights the determinants of 
the MIDCs’s position. 
The trade-labour discussion debate, that took place at the WTO, and to a lesser 
extent at the ILO throughout the 1990s, has been one of the most controversial 
issues concerning the multilateral trade regime.i The developing countries resisted 
its inclusion in the trade negotiations, out of fears of protectionism from 
industrialised countries. Perhaps due to this seemingly unanimous position, the 
‘developing country front’ has never been closely examined in the context of the 
trade-labour linkage. However, in the light of the increased Chinese exports to both 
developed and developing countries and the phasing out of the Multi-Fiber 
Agreement (MFA), the MIDCs themselves might start to consider supporting the 
linkage as a way to protect both their own industries and their export markets from 
the Chinese threat, given the fact that China has a remarkably poorer labour rights 
record than most of the countries in question.  
Those analysts suggesting such an increased linkage demand after China’s surge 
often regard the position shift in the MIDCs as an automatic change occasioned by 
exogenous economic dynamics, and overlook important domestic institutional 
mechanisms behind the foreign trade policy decision making that might constrain 
or facilitate the demand for linkage from within the countries in question.  
The article assesses both the international context of the linkage demand and its 
domestic institutional determinants in two countries – Mexico and South Africa – 
that, from an economic point of view,ii are expected to have changed their position 
after China’s accession to the WTO in 2001.iii The analysis is spread over two main 
parts. The first section assesses the economic conditions fostering a change in the 
case countries’ position (1.1), their labour standards record compared to China’s 
(1.2) and the evolution of their position towards the relationship between labour 
standards and trade from 1996 to 2008 (1.3). The second section explores the 
domestic institutional determinants of the issue. It proposes a theoretical model 
(2.1) that serves as a basis to explore the institutional setting of linkage in both 
Mexico and South Africa (2.2). A conclusion follows.  
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1. The economic justification of linkage 
1.1 South-south competition and Chinese import penetration  
Analystsiv often regard the developing country opposition against the trade-labour 
linkage as a logical outcome of their relative economic position. If labour standards 
were to be coupled to trade, their comparative advantage vis-à-vis the industrialised 
countries in terms of cheap labour would be dissolved in favour of disguised 
protectionism from the industrialised nations. However, when taking a quick 
glance at some basic data, that opposition is far from evident in the case of the 
MIDCs. For instance, whereas Mexico’s and South Africa’s monthly wages lag far 
behind the United States’s and the European Union’s, they clearly outperform India 
and China. Similar comparisons can be made on a whole range of variables such as 
GNI, labour productivity or the sectoral composition of the economy.v The question 
is then to which extent Mexican and African interests are aligned with those of the 
wealthier countries rather than with those of other developing countries.  
Chan and Rossvi argue that the exodus of labour-intensive industries from the 
developed towards the developing countries gradually shifts the balance from 
North-South competition towards South-South competition. In the case of apparel 
this is particularly clear: with both China and Mexico competing over the US 
market, events or developments at the international level can easily tip the balance 
in favour of one country at the cost of the other. While NAFTA improved the 
position of Mexican exporters, the accession of China to the WTO shifted the 
balance completely. In a recent study by Gallagher et al.vii the authors found that 
out of the 15 most important export products of Mexico, 14 were directly 
threatened by Chinese exports. Similar conclusions can be drawn from the Mexican 
and American official trade figures, from which it is clear that Mexico has been 
displaced as the largest exporter of apparel in the US market.viii 
Besides competition in export markets, rising imports from developing countries in 
other developing countries may threaten economic development by displacing 
domestic production. This is mainly the case for South Africa, where Chinese 
imports are perceived as a threat to the national textile industryix and where, 
according to WTO statistics, import of apparel grew by 500 per cent from 2002 to 
2006.x 
Both export concerns and import pressures are likely to trigger demand for 
protection from the affected production sectors. Labour standards can provide that 
protection.   
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1.2 Trade and labour as a tool of protection 
The use of trade sanctions to enforce labour standards has long been regarded as a 
way to protect a country’s level of social development without imperilling its 
international trade position.xi By assuming a negative impact of labour standards on 
trade competitiveness, linkage advocates argue that sanctions counter the risk that 
countries competitively lower their standards in order to preserve their relative 
trade position (the so-called ‘race to the bottom’).  
Even though the empirical evidence of the true relationship between labour 
standards and trade is scarce and inconclusive,xii the 1919 Constitution of the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) enshrined the argument in its preamble: 
‘(…) the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is an obstacle in 
the way of other nations which desire to improve the conditions in their own 
countries (…)’.xiii 
Consequently, labour standards have been used several times, by both developing 
and industrialised countries, as an instrument of trade policy.xiv As such, they enjoy 
one advantage over tariffs and NTBs: their ability to influence the competitive 
position of countries on third markets. While tariffs and NTBs are able to deter 
imports, they are not suitable to protect the competitive position of a country in its 
export markets. Labour standards, on the other hand, are able to do that by directly 
affecting the cost of labour in competitor countries.  
If labour standards are regarded as protectionist instruments, middle-income 
developing countries might plead for to incorporate them to multilateral trade to 
protect their own industries. Such a plea would only be credible, however, under 
the assumption that they have a better compliance record than the nations whose 
labour standards they attempt to influence. For Mexico and South Africa this seems 
to be the case. The following table shows the ratification status of the ILO Core 
Labour Standards Conventions (CLS) by Mexico, South Africa and China. In the 
table, one can see that South Africa has the best record in terms of the ratification 
of Conventions, whereas China’s ratifications only cover two of the four CLS. 
Mexico, with two unratified Conventions belonging to different CLS, can be 
situated in the middle. 
 4 
Table 1. Ratification status of the ILO conventions containing Core Labour 
Standards 
 
Source: Own elaboration on data from ILO, Follow-up to the Declaration. Status by country, 
http://www.ilo.org/declaration/follow-up/annualreview/ratificationstatus/lang--en/index.htm  
 
Ratification is, however, not to be equated with actual compliance.xv Several 
violations have been identified by institutions reviewing labour standards 
systematically.xvi  In the case of China, these concern especially the 
implementation of the free association and collective bargaining (FACB) rights and 
the prohibition of forced labour. The political control of the Chinese Communist 
Party over the formation and organisation of unions, the non-existence of strikes in 
legal documents, the imprisonment of protesting workers and the government’s Re-
Education Through Labour (RETL) program, in which minor offenders are forced 
to execute certain tasks without remuneration, have been repeatedly criticised.  
By contrast, besides sporadic references to rural child labour and racial 
discrimination, South Africa’s implementation of labour rights is praised by the ILO 
2000 Global Report as an example of ‘positive synergies between national political 
will and ILO’s technical expertise’, and no systematic CLS-related violations are 
registered.  
Mexico is again situated somewhere in the middle. Even though its score in the 
FACB index elaborated by the OECD is the same as South Africa,xvii the lack of 
actual protection of FACB rights is often cited, as well as the administrative 
difficulties to register independent unions, anti-union discrimination, blacklisting 
of workers, the lack of secret ballot in union elections and the use of collective 
bargaining contracts negotiated by management and trade unions unrelated to the 
workers.  
In sum, in terms of labour standards, Mexico and South Africa perform better than 
China. By demanding a trade-labour linkage in international trade agreements they 
could avoid or minimise the eventually resulting comparative disadvantages. As a 
result, they could not only protect their domestic market but also their export 
LS FACB Forced labour Discrimination Child labour 
Convention 
number 87 98 29 105 100 111 138 182 
         
China         1990 2006 1999 2002 
Mexico 1950   1934 1959 1952 1961 2000   
South 
Africa 1996 1996 1997 1997 2000 1997 2000 2000 
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interests, something that cannot be accomplished by traditional protectionist 
instruments. However, given the fact that South Africa experiences Chinese 
competition mainly in the context of its domestic market, where protection can be 
achieved by other means (tariffs, NTBs), whereas Mexico experiences the Chinese 
competition especially in the US market, it is reasonable, from an economic point 
of view, to expect a stronger demand for linkage from Mexico than from South 
Africa. 
1.3 The trade-labour linkage discussion and the developing countres’ position 
towards linkagexviii  
The use of labour standards in the multilateral trade context was discussed during 
the 1990s in two multilateral fora, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the 
International Labour Organization (ILO). At the WTO, the trade-labour issue was 
launched by the US during the Tokyo Round, in 1978, but the debate took place 
mainly during the Ministerial Conferences of Singapore (1996), Geneva (1998) and 
Seattle (1999), after several proposals had been introduced by the US, often with 
the support of the Scandinavian countries and some member states of the 
European Union. As stated in the introduction, the main feature of the discussion 
was the polarisation between developing countries, under the lead of India, and the 
industrialised nations, under the lead of the United States.xix 
Whereas the developed countries’ positions diverged, with the EU member states 
and the Scandinavian countries emphasising the human rights value of labour 
standards, and the US approaching labour standards in terms of the preservation of 
American trade competitiveness, the developing countries’ reactions were 
homogeneous. They mostly underscored the protectionist nature of labour 
standards (see table 2), both individually and collectively. Groups such as the G-77, 
the G-15 and the Non-Aligned Countries stated their opposition, and the issue has 
been called by Narlikar the largest and only victory of the informal group of 
developing countries.xx  
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Table 2. Labour at the WTO Ministerial Conferences 
A B C D 
Ministerial 
Conference 
Countries 
addressing 
linkage 
Countries 
against linkage 
(% of B) 
Countries 
referring to 
protectionism (% 
of B) 
Marrakech 45 53% 64% 
Singapore 79 64% 47% 
Seattle 67 61% 48% 
Doha 26 61% 50% 
    
Source: Own elaboration based on data from WTO, Documents online, http://documents.wto.org 
 
This polarisation could also be seen during the discussions in the tripartite 
framework of the ILO’s International Labour Conference both in 1994, when the 
idea of the introduction of a social clause was launched as a means to enhance the 
organisation’s role in the post-Cold War framework,xxi and in 1998, when the 
Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work was negotiated.xxii This 
time the employers’ groups from the industrialised and developing countries 
supported the developing country representatives in their demands for the 
rejection of a linkage within the ILO. The workers’ group homogeneously backed 
the industrialised countries in their plea for a strong Declaration.  
Mexico’s representatives made their position clear from the very beginning at both 
organisations. At the Singapore Ministerial, the Mexican Trade Secretary Herminio 
Blanco stated that raising the labour standards issue at the WTO would allow for 
the introduction of protectionist measures. Therefore, the appropriate forum to 
deal with labour standards issues was the ILO. Likewise, during the Seattle 
Ministerial Conference, he asserted that the trade-labour linkage at the WTO would 
open the door to protectionism. This position was further emphasised at the ILO, 
where the country’s representatives continuously stressed the non-linkage of trade 
and labour.xxiii During the 1998 drafting of the Declaration of Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work, Mexico took a leading role in the discussion, and 
introduced several proposals and amendments.xxiv Most of these proposals were 
aimed at making the Declaration a purely promotional document, which would 
create no new obligations for the ILO member countries. Significantly, together 
with other developing countries (such as India and Pakistan) it promoted the 
incorporation of a reference to the non-linkage between the Declaration and trade 
measures.xxv  
 7 
The statement in Seattle was the last official positioning of the country on the issue 
in the WTO. After that, the trade-labour linkage did not emerge in any public 
statements anymore, and, significantly, the topic was not addressed by the North 
American Competitiveness Council, a working group established in 2006 as a part 
of the Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) among the parties to NAFTA to 
assess the competitiveness of the region in the face of the Indian and Chinese 
competition. More recently, President Calderón expressed concern about 
protectionism within NAFTA after Barack Obama’s statements concerning the re-
opening of NAFTA and its labour and environmental side agreements.xxvi  
 The language employed by South Africa at the WTO condemned protectionism, 
but did so in a less direct way than Mexico. The statement of Alexander Erwin, 
Minister of Trade and Industry, at the Singapore Ministerial Conference, 
underlined the inadequacy of the WTO as a forum for the discussion of labour 
standards, but recognised the relation between labour and trade dynamics, and 
defended a strengthened coordination among the different multilateral 
organisations (WTO, ILO, IMF, and so on). President Mandela’s statement in 
Geneva was more explicit: ‘We believe that cooperation with the WTO, UNCTAD, 
ILO, UNDP, the World Bank and the IMF is essential. (…) There can be no refusal 
to discuss matters such as labour standards, social issues and the environment, but 
equally all must be prepared to listen carefully before judgements are made’. At the 
Doha Ministerial, Erwin emphasised again the need of cooperation, and defended 
the compatibility of trade with labour standards and sustainable development 
without positioning South Africa for or against the social clause. This ‘softer’ 
position shows a strong contrast with the official position issued by the South 
African government in June 2001: ‘We endorse the principle of core labour 
standards as enshrined in the ILO conventions. Like others, we reject the use of 
labour standards for protectionist purposes.’xxvii These views were recognised at the 
Singapore Conference where it was agreed that the ILO was the competent body to 
set, deal and promote core multilaterally negotiated labour standards. It was also 
agreed that the ILO and WTO Secretariats should continue their collaboration. 
At the ILO, and in contrast with Mexico, South Africa acknowledged the existence 
of a connection between trade and labour standards, but simultaneously argued 
that such a connection should not be used for trade or protectionist purposes. It 
also supported the incorporation of an operative follow-up procedure to the 
Declaration of 1998 and the need for a strong document. During the drafting of the 
Declaration, the South African government delegation supported the Workers’ 
group which had introduced a reference to the ILO as the ‘competent body to set 
and deal with fundamental labour standards’, against several other developing 
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countries, such as India and Pakistan, that preferred to stress the ILO’s character as 
the ‘constitutionally mandated body’.xxviii  
When assessing both countries the question can be posed why, in the face of 
competitive pressures, particularly from China, both in their domestic and export 
markets, Mexico and South-Africa (vehemently) opposed the trade-labour linkage.  
Economically, this would have been justified, especially since 2000.  
2. Linkage and the role of domestic institutions 
2.1 Theoretical justification 
The fact that the positions of Mexico and South Africa concerning linkage do not 
seem to have changed after China’s surge contradicts the economic argument that 
it should have evolved with the erosion of both countries’ competitive advantage in 
the international trading system. This is particularly true for the South African 
case, in which the position evolved from softer to more reluctant.  
The economic justification of the shift in the MIDCs position makes abstraction of 
the domestic mechanisms by which hypothetical interests are formed and 
translated into political demands. These mechanisms, identified by several 
authorsxxix, can be grouped under the name ‘institutions’, defined in this context as 
those arrangements that ‘aggregate the interests [of different societal groups] and 
determine the responsiveness of governments to them’xxx by expanding or 
constraining their relative societal power.xxxi Crucial to this alteration of power is 
the presence or absence of fragmentation of the decision making authority, since it 
determines the degree to which a decision maker is obliged to cater to the 
preferences of a specific constituency in exchange for their electoral support. 
According to a number of authors,xxxii lower levels of fragmentation, and thus 
higher levels of concentration, insulate the decision makers from the influence of 
particularistic interests in society, and allow them to generate policies that promote 
general national, rather than particularistic interests. In other words, state 
authorities will more readily be able to overcome logrolling dynamics, in which 
bargains between particularistic interests lead to collectively detrimental outcomes. 
In contrast, when a system is highly fragmented, it will be easier for particularistic 
interests to capture one of the fragments and tilt the policy making process towards 
the preferences of small, homogenous constituencies. As a consequence, well 
organised groups will often have power over the policies to follow. The two types of 
governments are respectively tagged as strong and weak by Gourevitch.xxxiii 
Translated into trade policy, this implies that strong governments are assumed to 
be more liberalisation prone than weak ones, since they are better shielded against 
societal demands of protection and since liberalisation is considered to benefit the 
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aggregate welfare of a country more than protection does. A change in the relative 
competitiveness of the country in question will therefore only see itself mirrored in 
the national trade policy to the extent that the state’s institutional setting 
effectively exposes officials to the influence of societal groups affected by that 
change in competitiveness. In this respect, Frieden and Rogowski hypothesise that 
‘the more influential are agencies relatively independent from direct political 
pressures in the making of international economic policy, the likelier is 
liberalisation’xxxiv.  
By incorporating institutions as explanatory variables, a theoretical model (Figure 
1) can be proposed in order to explain Mexico’s and South Africa’s choices 
concerning linkage, in which a loss in competitiveness with respect to China will have 
an impact on the country’s demand for linkage only if its institutions are sufficiently 
fragmented to allow access to the affected groups.  Empirical evidence for this model is 
offered in section 2.2.  
 
Figure 1. The institutionalist argument 
 
2.2 The institutional setting of linkage in Mexico and South Africa 
In this section, the Mexican and South African institutional settings and the 
internal demand for linkage produced in that setting are scrutinised. The analysis 
focuses on two institutional features through which the societal groups affected by 
a loss of competitiveness (workers) express their political demands. First, it 
explores the general features of the labour unions which, drawing on the 
preference distribution at the ILO (see above) and the patterns of linkage demand 
in developed countriesxxxv, are assumed to be the main group lobbying for 
protection in the form of linkage. Second, it assesses the structure of trade policy 
decision making and the degree to which that structure has been open to linkage 
demands.  
a) Mexico’s state corporatism and isolated executive 
The demand for a linkage between trade and labour standards in the Mexican 
context has been scarce, due to both the features of the Mexican labour 
associations, and the institutional isolation in which the formulation of the Mexican 
trade policy takes place.  
Change in 
competitiveness 
Institutions Demand for 
linkage 
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Mexican trade unionism is strongly related to the post-revolutionary governmental 
structure, maintained in place between 1946 and 2000 by the Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional (PRI).  
The Mexican political system during the PRI regime can be characterised as 
presidentialist, corporatist and centralist.xxxvi Organised labour constituted in this 
system one of the four pillars on which the PRI’s power rested.xxxvii The 
Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos (CTM) emerged as the dominant labour 
organisation. It adopted clientelistic tactics by which social peace and electoral 
support from the bases were rewarded with wage increases, administrative 
positions and Congressional seats.xxxviii Decision making in the trade unions was 
delegated to the national leaders, who bargained within the governing coalition led 
by the President. The legal system, which allowed for closed shop representation, 
further strengthened the CTM.xxxix  
From 1982 on, as a part of the new pragmatic, neoliberal approach, the government 
elite approached the business community as a means of achieving broad support 
for economic reformsxl. The reforms diminished the political power of the trade 
union movement, which was further weakened by the changes in the electoral 
landscape and the gradual political reforms during the 90s. In 1997, several unions 
separated from the umbrella organisation that had previously accommodated the 
CTM-related trade unions, and founded the Unión Nacional de Trabajadores (UNT) 
together with some smaller federations. However, it was the CTM who formally 
remained the privileged partner of the regime. From 2000 on, Vicente Fox’s 
government further prolonged the status quo, and no permanent venues for inter-
confederation dialogue were opened.xli In this sense, Mexican corporatism proved 
to be a state corporatism, rather than party corporatism.xlii  
Within the CTM there has been no debate on the trade-labour linkage. During the 
negotiations of NAFTA’s labour side agreement, no consultations with these unions 
were carried out.xliii This lack of interest is further confirmed by the scarce use of 
the enforcement procedures provided by NAFTA’s labour side agreement.xliv Up to 
date, the most active union in this context is the UNT’s member Frente Auténtico 
del Trabajo (FAT). The FAT, that has established transnational links with Canadian 
and American trade unions and NGOs,xlv advocates the inclusion of a social clause 
in trade agreements.xlvi Nevertheless, it does not have any formal institutional 
access to the formulation of trade policy, and its membership (and therefore its 
mobilisation potential) remains limited as compared to the CTM’s. 
Given the lack of formal institutional access to the executive, alternative channels 
to influence policy making have been sought by the FAT. Besides the intensive use 
of transnational networks, the confederation has established close links to the left-
wing Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD).xlvii During some debates at the 
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Chamber of Deputies and in documents from the party’s think tank,xlviii PRD 
representatives advocated the incorporation of a social clause in the WTO rules in 
order to protect the agricultural sector, around which the discussions concerning 
the liberalisation of international trade are centred at the Mexican Congress.xlix 
Besides, the surge of Chinese imports has been discussed by the Mexican Senate 
during some debates in 2006 and 2007, when both the Labour and Economy 
Secretaries were asked to pursue Chinese compliance with previously acquired 
labour and commercial commitments, and where new tariffs on Chinese products 
were clearly demanded.l The plea at the Senate was less related to party cleavages 
than to regional issues, since the senators demanding protection against Chinese 
shoe and textile imports were those in whose constituency (the state of 
Guanajuato) those industries are an important source of employment.li  
 Both the PRD statements on the social clause and the Senate’s plea on labour rights 
seem to have borne a limited influence on the trade policy making by the 
Executive. The Secretaría de Economía (SE), that coordinates trade policy, 
negotiated in 2006 an agreement with the Chinese government in order to extend 
the phasing out of the MFA, but made no statements on the labour standards topic.  
This can be related to the large degree of autonomy that the formal and informal 
frameworks regarding trade policy formulation give to the Mexican executive 
power. Pursuant Article 131 of the Mexican Constitution, the 1993 External Trade 
Act outlines the Mexican trade policy. Article 5, sub IX of the law assigns to the 
Secretaría de Economía (SE) the responsibility to negotiate trade agreements,lii and 
it offers the organism the possibility of involving the productive sectors in 
consultations, if so desired by the SE itself.liii  
Besides the provisions contained in the trade law, the SE has established a Consejo 
Asesor para las Negociaciones Comerciales Internacionales (Advisory Council for 
International Commercial Negotiations) in 1993.liv The Council is composed by 
representatives of the academic, agricultural, labour, and entrepreneurial sectors, 
and by foreign trade experts. It is chaired by the SE’s head, who can freely appoint 
and remove members.lv Due to the lack of public information, the composition of 
the Council, the topics discussed during the meetings and the extent to which it is 
fully operational are unknown. 
From the foregoing paragraphs two main conclusions can be drawn with respect to 
the Mexican domestic debate on the social clause. First, the distinctive institutional 
features of the Mexican trade unionism have not fostered any public debate on the 
social clause, even though there seems to be a demand by the UNT unions, 
especially the FAT, and by some sectoral interests (shoe and textile). Second, even 
though it has been translated into a political argument through the PRD and at the 
Senate, this demand has not found its way into the political establishment, 
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hypothetically due to the deficit of institutional venues to influence the trade 
policy formulation by the SE, which can be related to the Mexican presidential 
tradition. The lack of formal involvement of the Senate and the labour movement 
in the trade policy making, and the absence of any type of accountability by the 
trade advisory council suggest that the means of control on the trade policy are 
reduced to informal pressure on the Executive, which might be difficult to exercise 
by opposition parties (in casu the party advocating the social clause).  
b)  South African trade policy making: bottom-up participation by labour with 
close ties to the executive  
The social clause debate in South Africa seems to have had a more public 
dimension than it does in Mexico. Organised labour, the employers’ associations 
and the government participated in consultations during the 1990s and came to a 
framework agreement on the issue. The institutional setting against which this 
agreement occurred is discussed below.  
The landscape of South African trade unionism has been strongly influenced by 
both the apartheid regime and the post apartheid reconstruction of the 
governmental arrangements. The South African trade union movement played an 
important role during the apartheid. Internationally, it acquired visibility partly 
thanks to the support of the ILO’s 1964 Declaration concerning action against 
apartheid,lvi which stated that the ILO’s secretariat would provide assistance to 
worker unions independent from the regime.lvii In the subsequent years, and 
especially after the Durban strikes of 1973, several independent unions (consisting 
almost exclusively of African members) emerged. They promoted participatory 
shopfloor democracy as a means of emancipation, and were recognised by the 
government in 1979. In 1985 they fused with other nonracial unions in the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), that would become one of the 
most active actors in the struggle against apartheid. COSATU was from the 
beginning linked to the African National Congresslviii (ANC), and in the early 1990s 
the links were formalised and political decisions were left to the ANC. A ‘Tripartite 
Alliance’ was formed between COSATU, the ANC and the South African 
Communist Party. After the fall of the apartheid regime in 1994, several COSATU 
members appeared on the ANC lists for the parliamentary election.lix  
After the formation of a Government of National Unity (GNU) under Nelson 
Mandela, organisational and strategy problems emerged in the midst of COSATU, 
given the fact that the contestation tactics used so far needed to be changed in a 
parliamentary regime where the ANC enjoyed the majority.lx Furthermore, 
programmatic differences regarding the neoliberal reforms have constituted a 
source of conflict since the Mandela government,lxi and some authors argue that 
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the alliance’s role has been marginalised during the last decade. The abandonment 
of the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP), on which the electoral 
manifesto of 1994 was based,lxii to promote the less social-democratically oriented 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR), was seen as a sign of COSATU’s 
weakening. To this can be added the fall of the membership during the last years, 
and the lack of leadership.lxiii Yet, COSATU is still the largest trade union umbrella 
organisation in South Africa, followed by the National Council of Trade Unions 
(NACTU) and the Federation of Unions of South Africa (FEDUSA), and remains 
close to the ANC regime.lxiv  
The linkage debate, of which the results were described as a success of the South 
African labour movementlxv, took place in South Africa during the 1990s. It 
defended the incorporation of a social clause involving sanctions to free trade 
agreements in several resolutions, and it proposed the incorporation of a social 
clause to both the EU-South Africa Trade, Development and Cooperation 
Agreement, and to the Trade Protocol of the South African Development 
Community (SADC) in its submissions to the South African Parliament.lxvi It also 
advocated the elimination of Export Processing Zones (EPZs) in the neighbouring 
countries and addressed the ‘race to the bottom’ phenomenon. Simultaneously, it 
expressed some fear of possible protectionist uses of labour standards by the G-7.lxvii 
In 2005, it confirmed its position for the inclusion of a social clause in the WTO, 
what starkly contrasts with the government’s position on the issue (cf. supra). Its 
textile affiliate, the South African Clothing and Textile Workers’ Union (SACTWU), 
has underscored the labour standards argument on its position concerning Chinese 
imports, whereas neither NACTU nor FEDUSA have expressed any preference on 
the subject.lxviii  
The primary venue through which COSATU attempted to translate its social clause 
proposal into a policy was the National Economic and Development and Labour 
Council (NEDLAC), a social dialogue organ formed after the apartheid under the 
advice of the ILO and whose composition and functions were established in the 
NEDLAC Act of 1994. It incorporates representatives from labour (the three main 
federations), business associations, the South African government and the 
community (youth, women, disabled people, and cooperatives associations). They 
are appointed by the corresponding minister upon a nomination by the relevant 
organisations. It gathers four times a year, and organises an Annual Summit. It has 
four chambers, among which a Trade and Industry one, which shares with the 
other chambers the tasks of concluding agreements, considering changes to social 
and economic policy (which includes trade) before they are discussed in 
Parliament, and promoting coordinated policies, among other.lxix  
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Trade policy is carried out in South Africa by the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI), which receives input from both NEDLAC and other ministries and 
agencies.lxx NEDLAC labour and business representatives have been part of the 
South African delegations to the WTO Ministerial Conferences at least in two 
occasions: Seattle (1999) and Hong Kong (2005).lxxi 
Even though the DTI has not externalised any opinion on the trade-labour issue 
aside from the WTO statements (cf. supra), the Trade and Industry Chamber of 
NEDLAC served as a forum for discussion on the social clause between 1995 and 
1996. Labour representatives, backed by business, proposed the inclusion of a 
social clause in all South Africa’s bilateral and multilateral trade agreements. The 
final result of the discussions was the ‘Framework Agreement on the Social 
Clause’.lxxii It embedded the social clause in the ‘history of the struggle for human 
rights in South Africa’, and stated that the commitment with workers’ rights was a 
‘cornerstone of South Africa’s new democracy’.lxxiii It envisioned a ‘creative and 
multifaceted strategy’ to deal with the opposition against the social clause by other 
developing countries. However, the consensus seems to have eroded. NEDLAC’s 
2005 annual report stated that the Chamber of Trade and Industry did not manage 
to achieve a common position on the social clause.lxxiv  
Despite this seemingly participatory approach, some difficulties in the South 
African social dialogue model have been identified. Besides the limited weight of 
COSATU in the Tripartite Alliance (see above), since 1996 macroeconomic policy 
cannot be negotiated within NEDLAC due to the government’s position. NEDLAC 
acts rather as the setting where the ‘implementation of liberalisation could be 
negotiated’. Its influence on the linkage position of the government is therefore 
limited. Besides, the organism’s lack of organisational capacity and expertise to 
engage in trade negotiations has also been pointed out.lxxv  
When contrasting the position of South African labour with the statements of South 
Africa, the initial ‘softer’ approach towards the trade-labour linkage and its later 
change can be better understood. The autonomy and institutional means of access 
enjoyed by labour in general and COSATU in particular may have, until a certain 
extent, influenced the South African position at the WTO. The strong shift in the 
South African policy throughout the 1990s (cf. supra) can be explained by the 
waning power of COSATU, which would have entailed a movement of the DTI 
decision making processes towards more autonomy (cf. supra, strong states).  
Conclusions 
This paper has assessed the evolution of the trade-labour linkage politics of two 
countries, Mexico and South Africa, during the 1990s. It analyzed potential 
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domestic determinants of the linkage from both a theoretical and an empirical 
point of view.   
A first striking fact is that, in spite of the strong change that both countries’ 
international economic position has experienced since China’s accession to the 
WTO, their position on linkage does not seem to have considerably changed. 
Whether a certain indifference or even opposition against linkage as a form of 
protection during the 1990s may be justified by pointing at their former economic 
situation, the current lack of a demand for linkage asks for further explanation if it 
is assumed that labour standards are a protectionist tool. The paper argues that the 
missing pieces of the puzzle are institutional arrangements insulating a 
government from or exposing it to societal pressures.  
Domestically, Mexico can be categorised as a strong government, which enjoys 
considerable autonomy in pursuing trade liberalisation. The lack of a Mexican 
active trade union tradition, coupled to the reduced participation of any institutions 
other than the Executive in the trade decision making processes, justify the lack of 
responsiveness of the regime. Even though during the last years some linkage 
demands have emerged at Congress, they have not been mirrored by the SE’s 
policy, with the exception of the negotiation of the MFA’s phasing out extension.    
On the other hand, the ‘softer’ position of South Africa during the beginning of the 
1990s can be seen as an indicator of some institutional receptivity to the issue. In 
Gourevitch’s terms, we could state that the South African regime can be seen as 
‘weaker’ than the Mexican one. Nevertheless, the existence of a participatory union 
tradition and formal institutional venues do not fully account for the weakness or 
strength of the government, but are also influenced by the policy line of the power 
elite. This is confirmed by the fact that Mbeki’s DTI has shown more assertiveness 
and autonomy after 2000, in spite of the civil society’s complaints about Chinese 
competition.   
Domestic institutional components are certainly not the only factor influencing 
trade policy. Changes in the economic cost-benefit distribution seem to bear 
influence in the demand for linkage, and the homogeneity with which the 
developing countries have reacted so far to the US proposals on the issue may have 
set a precedent for future discussions. With the chances of a reintroduction of 
linkage by the Obama administration being high, the MIDCs will be obliged to 
review their positions. Linkage demand by internal actors with institutional access 
might be decisive in fracturing the developing country b.
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